Wharton Model Says Uncapping STEM Green Cards Could Raise U.S. Output 4%

August 11, 2026 | Chandra Dhopatkar | Breaking News, Careers, Post Secondary, STEM Education, Workforce Development

International and U.S. STEM students working together in an American engineering laboratory.

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Published August 11, 2026. TechEd Magazine reviewed the Penn Wharton Budget Model analysis and underlying working paper, National Science Foundation workforce and higher-education data, Bureau of Labor Statistics employment projections, and the U.S. Department of State’s August 2026 Visa Bulletin. The Penn Wharton findings discussed below are economic model projections based on a hypothetical policy change—not estimates of a policy that has been enacted. Immigration rules, visa availability, labor-market conditions, and enrollment patterns may change.

A new economic model released August 11 puts a large number on a debate that reaches far beyond immigration policy.

The Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates that exempting qualifying advanced-degree STEM immigrants from employment-based green-card caps could raise U.S. economic output 4.0% above its current-law baseline by 2059, while lowering federal debt held by the public by 5.5%.

But for STEM educators, colleges and workforce leaders, the more important story may be hiding behind the economic projection.

The United States is already deeply dependent on internationally educated and foreign-born technical talent. National Science Foundation data show that foreign-born workers accounted for 22% of the nation’s 37 million-person STEM workforce in 2024. Among scientists and engineers with advanced degrees, the percentages are substantially higher.

Meanwhile, international students on temporary visas earned 42% of U.S. science and engineering master’s degrees and 38% of research doctorates in 2024. In computer and information sciences, temporary visa holders received 61% of doctorates. In engineering, they received 54%.

And one more number complicates the picture: international science and engineering master’s enrollment in the United States fell 24% between 2024 and 2025.

Taken together, those findings raise a larger question for American education policy:

Does the United States actually have one STEM pipeline—or a STEM talent ecosystem that depends simultaneously on domestic K–12 education, CTE, colleges, graduate schools, employers and international talent?

For TechEd Magazine readers, that is the issue worth examining.

Key Takeaways

Penn Wharton Budget Model released new STEM immigration modeling on August 11, 2026.
The model estimates an advanced-degree STEM green-card exemption could raise U.S. output 4.0% above baseline by 2059 and reduce federal debt held by the public 5.5%.
The modeled policy is not current law. It resembles provisions previously proposed in the America COMPETES Act of 2022 and the Keep STEM Talent Act of 2023, neither of which was enacted.
Foreign-born workers represented 22% of the broad U.S. STEM workforce in 2024, according to NSF.
Temporary visa holders earned 42% of S&E master’s degrees and 38% of research doctorates in 2024, including a majority of doctorates in computer and information sciences, engineering, and mathematics and statistics.
International S&E enrollment fell 9% overall from 2024 to 2025, while international S&E master’s enrollment fell 24%.
BLS projects employment in its more narrowly defined STEM occupations to grow 8.1% from 2024 to 2034, versus 2.7% for non-STEM occupations.
The Penn Wharton model does not project equal benefits for every worker. Incumbent foreign-born STEM workers experience persistent labor-income losses relative to the baseline in the model.
The education implication is not “immigration instead of domestic STEM education.” The stronger question is how the United States builds, attracts and retains enough talent across the entire technical workforce.

Breaking News

On August 11, 2026, Penn Wharton Budget Model published new analysis estimating the economic and fiscal effects of exempting qualifying advanced-degree STEM immigrants from employment-based green-card caps. The model projects U.S. output 4.0% above current law and federal debt held by the public 5.5% below baseline by 2059. The analysis models a hypothetical policy and does not represent a change in federal immigration law.

What Penn Wharton Released Today

The August 11 Penn Wharton analysis summarizes a broader working paper titled The Economic and Fiscal Impact of STEM Immigration in General Equilibrium.

Researchers Alexander Arnon, Duncan Haystead, Felix Reichling, Germán Sánchez Sánchez, Kent Smetters and Jesús Villero constructed a general-equilibrium model that allows labor supply, wages, productivity, capital accumulation, government revenue, spending and federal debt to adjust together.

The model asks what would happen if immigrants holding qualifying master’s or doctoral degrees in STEM fields were exempted from both the annual employment-based visa cap and the per-country limit.

Non-STEM immigration remains unchanged in the modeled scenario.

The policy begins in 2027 inside the model.

That distinction is critical.

What the Study Is—and Is Not

	Penn Wharton Analysis
What it is	An economic model examining a hypothetical STEM green-card exemption
Population targeted	Qualifying immigrants with advanced STEM degrees
Caps modeled as removed	Employment-based annual cap and per-country limit
Non-STEM visas	Left unchanged
Model start	2027
Policy inspiration	Provisions resembling the America COMPETES Act of 2022 and Keep STEM Talent Act of 2023
Current federal law?	No
Forecast guaranteed to occur?	No
Primary purpose	Estimate economic, wage, productivity, fiscal and welfare effects under specified assumptions

This is therefore not a prediction that U.S. GDP will increase 4%.

It is an estimate of what the researchers’ model says would occur relative to a current-law baseline if the specified policy were adopted and the model’s economic relationships hold.

That qualification should remain attached to every headline number.

What the Model Projects

The projected economic effects build gradually.

Measure	2034	2044	2059
Output	+0.8%	+2.2%	+4.0%
Effective labor input	+0.3%	+1.0%	+1.7%
Total factor productivity	+0.5%	+0.9%	+1.3%
Capital	+0.2%	+1.4%	+3.9%
Private consumption	+0.8%	+1.9%	+3.5%
Average wage per efficiency unit	+0.7%	+1.5%	+2.7%

Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model.

Penn Wharton identifies three major channels.

First, the working-age population expands.

Second, the larger STEM workforce increases total factor productivity through the innovation effect incorporated into the model.

Third, households respond to the higher productivity path by accumulating additional capital.

The model therefore does not treat STEM professionals merely as people filling open jobs.

It assumes additional STEM employment can also contribute to broader productivity.

That assumption becomes central to the results.

The Federal Budget Result Is Also Substantial

Penn Wharton projects federal revenues 3.8% above baseline by 2059 while federal outlays rise only 0.9%.

Under those assumptions, federal debt held by the public ends 2059 5.5% below baseline.

The researchers attribute much of the fiscal difference to the characteristics of the modeled immigrants: they are primarily working-age, highly educated individuals who expand taxable labor and capital income.

Again, those are modeled outcomes—not observed fiscal results.

But they change the nature of the policy argument.

A STEM immigration debate is not solely about whether an employer can fill a vacancy.

It can also involve innovation, productivity, labor-market composition, capital formation and government finances.

The Green-Card Constraint Is Not Theoretical

The timing of the new study is notable because employment-based visa limits are producing visible constraints right now.

The U.S. Department of State’s August 2026 Visa Bulletin states that the worldwide employment-based preference level is at least 140,000, while the statutory per-country limit for preference immigrants is 7% of the combined family- and employment-preference limits.

For August:

China’s EB-2 final-action date is September 1, 2021.
India’s EB-2 final-action category is listed as unavailable.
India’s EB-3 final-action date is January 1, 2014.
The State Department warns that increased EB-2 demand may require additional retrogression or make that category unavailable.

This does not mean every STEM immigrant belongs to one of those categories.

But it demonstrates why the numerical limits modeled by Penn Wharton are not merely theoretical constraints inside an economic paper.

Visa availability can directly affect when some highly educated workers are able to obtain permanent residence.

The Education Story Is Bigger Than the Immigration Story

For TechEd Magazine, the strongest evidence may come not from Wharton but from the National Science Foundation.

The National Science Board’s 2026 Science and Engineering Indicators show that 37 million Americans worked in the broad STEM workforce in 2024.

Eight million—22%—were foreign-born.

Foreign-born representation rises substantially with educational attainment.

Among U.S. science and engineering workers in 2023, foreign-born workers accounted for:

20% of those whose highest degree was a bachelor’s;
39% of those with master’s degrees;
46% of those with doctoral degrees.

Among doctoral-level workers, 57% of computer and mathematical scientists and 58% of engineers were foreign-born.

That is not a marginal contribution to the U.S. technical workforce.

It is structural.

TechEd Magazine examined this issue from another direction years ago in Pentagon Says STEM Education Deficit Is Weakening America, which discussed the growing reliance of American universities and technical industries on internationally sourced STEM talent.

The 2026 NSF data show why that conversation remains relevant.

International Students Produce a Large Share of Advanced U.S. STEM Degrees

The education-to-workforce connection becomes even clearer when looking at graduate degrees.

Temporary visa holders earned:

U.S. S&E degree level, 2024	Share earned by temporary visa holders
Associate’s	2%
Bachelor’s	6%
Master’s	42%
Research doctorate	38%

Source: National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2026.

The concentration becomes greater in several strategically important fields.

In 2024, temporary visa holders received:

61% of computer and information-sciences doctorates
54% of engineering doctorates
52% of mathematics and statistics doctorates

They also accounted for more than half of master’s degrees awarded in each of those three fields.

Those figures should change how educators think about the phrase “U.S. STEM pipeline.”

American universities are not simply producing an American-born STEM workforce.

They are operating as major nodes in a global talent system.

But Another 2026 Data Point Should Concern Higher Education

The pipeline is not moving in only one direction.

NSF reports that approximately 463,000 international students were enrolled in U.S. science and engineering degree programs in fall 2025, down 9% from 2024.

International S&E master’s enrollment fell 24% in a single year, from approximately 211,000 students in 2024 to 161,000 in 2025.

The decline was especially large among students from India.

NSF reports that international S&E master’s enrollment from India fell 39% from 2024 to 2025.

TechEd Magazine is not attributing that decline to a single cause. The NSF data establish the enrollment change; they do not justify reducing a complex international enrollment trend to one explanation.

But the timing matters.

A new economic model is arguing that the United States could benefit significantly from retaining more advanced STEM talent at the same time federal data show that one of the principal pipelines supplying that talent recently contracted.

That deserves attention from university leaders.

One Important Data Clarification: Why NSF Says 37 Million STEM Workers and BLS Says 10.8 Million

Readers examining federal STEM data may encounter what looks like a contradiction.

NSF reports roughly 37 million STEM workers.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports roughly 10.8 million STEM jobs in 2024.

Both can be correct because the agencies use different definitions.

NSF’s Broader STEM Workforce

The National Science Board includes traditional science and engineering occupations plus a large skilled technical or STEM middle-skill workforce.

That broader framework is especially relevant to CTE and community colleges.

BLS’s STEM Occupational Definition

The Bureau of Labor Statistics STEM employment table uses a narrower occupational definition concentrating on computer and mathematical, architecture and engineering, life and physical science, related management and teaching positions, and some technically specialized sales occupations.

Under that definition:

STEM employment totaled 10.78 million in 2024;
BLS projects 11.65 million in 2034;
projected growth is 8.1%;
non-STEM employment is projected to grow 2.7%;
and the 2024 median STEM wage was $103,580, compared with $48,000 for non-STEM occupations.

This distinction is essential.

Penn Wharton focuses on college-educated STEM workers.

BLS focuses on a defined set of STEM occupations.

NSF’s broader workforce framework includes millions of technical workers without bachelor’s degrees.

Those are three related but different populations.

America Therefore Has at Least Two STEM Talent Problems

One involves advanced-degree scientists, engineers, computer professionals and researchers.

The other involves the enormous skilled technical workforce required to translate scientific and engineering capacity into operating infrastructure.

That second group includes roles such as:

engineering technicians;
semiconductor technicians;
industrial maintenance technicians;
automation specialists;
cybersecurity technicians;
laboratory technicians;
electrical technicians;
manufacturing technicians;
robotics technicians;
and other middle-skill technical occupations.

TechEd Magazine’s recent analysis, Semiconductor Education Is Becoming National Infrastructure, illustrates why this distinction matters.

A semiconductor ecosystem needs Ph.D. researchers and advanced engineers.

It also needs thousands of technicians capable of operating, maintaining, calibrating and troubleshooting complex production equipment.

The same relationship appears in the industries examined in The Return of Industrial Policy Is Reshaping Career and Technical Education.

A national STEM strategy cannot concentrate only on one end of the credential spectrum.

Domestic STEM Education and International Talent Are Not Necessarily Opposing Strategies

Public discussion often frames the issue as an either-or choice:

Train more Americans or bring in more international STEM workers.

That framing may be too simple.

Penn Wharton’s model specifically estimates a relatively strong degree of complementarity between college-educated domestic and foreign-born STEM workers.

The key substitution elasticity in the model is 5.63. Penn Wharton emphasizes that this assumption materially affects whether domestic STEM workers gain or lose from the modeled immigration expansion.

Under the researchers’ central assumptions, domestic high-education STEM workers have average labor income 1.3% above baseline by 2059.

But incumbent foreign-born STEM workers are 1.0% below baseline.

This matters for two reasons.

First, the study does not claim nobody loses.

Second, its positive result for domestic STEM workers depends significantly on an estimated economic relationship.

If foreign and domestic STEM workers were more substitutable than the researchers estimate, the distribution of gains could differ.

That is precisely why the 4% GDP number should not be separated from the model assumptions that produce it.

The Model’s Distributional Result Is More Complicated Than the Headline

By 2059, Penn Wharton projects average labor-income changes relative to baseline of:

Worker group	Modeled labor-income change by 2059
Lower-education domestic workers	+4.7%
Lower-education foreign-born workers	+4.2%
Higher-education non-STEM domestic workers	+1.3%
Higher-education non-STEM foreign-born workers	+0.8%
Higher-education domestic STEM workers	+1.3%
Higher-education foreign-born STEM workers	-1.0%
All workers	+2.9%

Source: Penn Wharton Budget Model.

That distribution is one reason the study deserves analysis instead of a headline rewrite.

The model produces substantial aggregate gains while simultaneously projecting concentrated losses among the workers who most closely compete with new arrivals.

Reasonable policy disagreements can therefore involve not only the total size of the economic gain, but also its distribution, the confidence placed in the underlying assumptions and the objectives policymakers assign to immigration policy.

The Harder Education Question Remains Unanswered

Penn Wharton’s model asks what happens if the United States admits more advanced STEM workers.

It does not answer another question:

Why does the United States require so much internationally sourced STEM talent in the first place?

That question cannot be reduced to a simple failure of American education.

A world-leading research economy would be expected to attract scientists and engineers from around the world.

But domestic capacity still matters.

TechEd Magazine’s State of STEM and Technical Education in the U.S. — 2026 documents persistent challenges involving access, preparation, instructor capacity and technical pathways.

America’s Skills Gap Has a Multiplier: Missing CTE Instructors examines another constraint: expanding programs means little if schools cannot find enough qualified people to teach them.

And Where Workforce Development Begins argues that talent development often begins far earlier than employer recruiting.

Those challenges remain even if immigration policy changes.

Universities Are Both Schools and Talent Gateways

The NSF degree data show why higher education deserves special attention in this discussion.

Universities do more than educate already-established members of the U.S. workforce.

They attract international students, provide graduate-level STEM training, integrate students into research laboratories and connect many graduates to American employers.

NSF reports that about three-quarters of temporary-visa S&E doctorate recipients have historically intended to remain in the United States after graduating.

Among temporary visa holders who earned S&E doctorates from 2017 through 2019, approximately 73% were still in the United States about five years later.

In that sense, higher education is not only a producer of credentials.

It is part of America’s talent-attraction infrastructure.

The distinction matters when universities evaluate graduate recruitment, research capacity, employer partnerships and international-student support.

CTE Has a Different but Equally Important Role

The Penn Wharton policy would target advanced STEM degree holders.

It would not solve shortages across the skilled technical workforce.

That is where CTE, technical colleges, apprenticeships and community colleges remain indispensable.

TechEd Magazine’s Bridging the Workforce Gap identified recruiting talent, aligning curriculum and building employer-education ecosystems as recurring requirements for engineering-technology workforce development.

Those responsibilities do not disappear because more engineers or scientists receive permanent residence.

In fact, increased high-level innovation and industrial investment can create additional downstream demand for technicians.

The technician pipeline and advanced-degree pipeline should therefore be treated as connected systems—not substitutes.

What STEM, CTE and Higher-Education Leaders Should Do Now

1. Map the actual STEM workforce your region depends on

Do not stop at broad labels such as STEM, engineering or technology.

Identify:

occupations;
degree levels;
technical credentials;
employers;
annual openings;
retirement risk;
international-worker concentration;
and hard-to-fill competencies.

Different workforce problems require different education strategies.

2. Separate advanced STEM talent from the skilled technical workforce

A shortage of semiconductor process engineers is not the same problem as a shortage of equipment technicians.

A cybersecurity research shortage is not identical to a shortage of entry-level security analysts.

A strong regional strategy should map both.

3. Measure international-student dependence

Universities and employers should know how much of their advanced talent pipeline depends on international students.

Questions should include:

What share of graduate STEM enrollment is international?
In which programs?
How has enrollment changed?
What percentage of graduates remain locally or nationally?
Which employers hire them?
Are changes affecting research staffing or course viability?

4. Strengthen domestic entry points simultaneously

International recruitment should not substitute for investments in American students.

K–12 mathematics and science preparation, STEM career exposure, high-quality CTE, dual enrollment, apprenticeships, community-college transfer pathways and university completion all remain essential.

5. Build clearer technician-to-engineer pathways

Students should be able to move from:

secondary CTE → certificate → associate degree → employment → bachelor’s degree → advanced technical study

without repeatedly starting over.

That is particularly important in industries where technician and engineering roles coexist.

6. Treat employer demand as evidence, not assumption

Programs should require employers to identify:

specific occupations;
competencies;
expected hiring;
educational requirements;
wage ranges;
work-based learning capacity;
and advancement pathways.

The broader workforce-development principles described in America’s Advanced Manufacturing Workforce apply far beyond manufacturing.

7. Monitor international enrollment as a workforce indicator

University international enrollment is often treated primarily as an admissions or tuition issue.

For STEM-heavy institutions, it may also be a future workforce indicator.

The 24% decline in international S&E master’s enrollment between 2024 and 2025 deserves continued observation.

Questions That Remain Unanswered

Would Congress actually enact an uncapped STEM category?

The Penn Wharton analysis models a policy similar to provisions previously proposed in Congress.

Neither referenced proposal became law.

The economic study therefore should not be interpreted as evidence that a policy change is imminent.

Would the economic effects match the model?

No model can guarantee that.

The outcome depends on assumptions involving immigration flows, worker substitutability, productivity spillovers, capital accumulation, demographics and government finances.

Why did international S&E master’s enrollment fall so sharply?

The NSF data establish the decline but do not establish one simple cause.

Further institution-level and national research will be required.

Would more international STEM talent reduce pressure to educate U.S.-born students?

That would be a policy choice, not a necessary consequence of immigration.

A growing technology economy could increase demand for both domestic and internationally sourced talent.

Which occupations would benefit most?

The Wharton model works with broad labor categories rather than producing a program-by-program forecast for cybersecurity, semiconductor engineering, biotechnology, AI, robotics or other specific fields.

What happens to incumbent foreign-born STEM workers?

This is one of the study’s most important distributional questions.

Penn Wharton projects persistent labor-income losses relative to baseline for that group.

Questions to Ask Your Program

What percentage of our STEM enrollment is international?
Which programs rely most heavily on international graduate students?
Has that enrollment changed since 2024?
Which local STEM employers rely heavily on foreign-born technical talent?
Which occupations require master’s or doctoral degrees, and which require technical credentials or associate degrees?
Are we conflating advanced-degree STEM shortages with technician shortages?
Where do students leave our domestic STEM pipeline?
Do secondary CTE students have articulated pathways into engineering and science programs?
Can technical-college graduates transfer without losing substantial credit?
Are employers participating in curriculum design, internships, research and work-based learning?
Do we measure STEM success by enrollment or by actual workforce transition?
Which fast-growing technical occupations are not currently represented in our programs?
Are instructor shortages limiting our ability to expand?
How exposed is our program to major changes in international enrollment?
What would our regional STEM pipeline look like if international enrollment declined significantly?
What would it look like if substantially more advanced STEM graduates remained in the United States?

Frequently Asked Questions

What did Penn Wharton release on August 11, 2026?

Penn Wharton Budget Model released an analysis estimating the economic and fiscal effects of exempting qualifying advanced-degree STEM immigrants from employment-based green-card caps.

Does the study represent a new federal policy?

No.

The researchers modeled a hypothetical policy resembling provisions in earlier congressional proposals that were not enacted.

How much additional economic growth does the study estimate?

Penn Wharton estimates U.S. output would be 4.0% above its current-law baseline by 2059 under its modeled scenario.

Does that mean GDP would grow only 4% between now and 2059?

No.

The 4% figure is the difference between the modeled policy scenario and the researchers’ current-law baseline in 2059. It is not total U.S. economic growth over that period.

How many STEM workers in the United States are foreign-born?

Under NSF’s broad STEM workforce definition, approximately 8 million of 37 million STEM workers in 2024 were foreign-born, or 22%.

Why does BLS list only about 10.8 million STEM workers?

BLS uses a narrower occupational definition. NSF includes a broader range of STEM and skilled technical occupations.

The numbers should not be compared without considering methodology.

What percentage of advanced U.S. STEM degrees go to international students?

In 2024, temporary visa holders earned approximately 42% of U.S. S&E master’s degrees and 38% of research doctorates.

Which doctoral fields rely most heavily on temporary visa holders?

In 2024, temporary visa holders received 61% of computer and information-sciences doctorates, 54% of engineering doctorates and 52% of mathematics and statistics doctorates.

Is international STEM enrollment growing?

Not recently across all levels.

NSF reports that international S&E enrollment fell 9% from 2024 to 2025 and master’s enrollment fell 24%.

Does Penn Wharton find that every worker benefits?

No.

The model projects persistent labor-income losses relative to baseline for incumbent foreign-born STEM workers, while most other groups ultimately experience gains.

Would more STEM green cards eliminate the need for CTE?

No.

The modeled exemption concerns advanced-degree STEM workers. CTE and technical colleges educate large portions of the skilled technical workforce that do not require master’s or doctoral degrees.

Future Outlook

The immediate importance of the Penn Wharton study is analytical rather than legislative.

Nothing changed in federal immigration law on August 11 simply because the analysis was published.

What changed is the evidence available for the next debate.

Several indicators now deserve continued attention.

Employment-based visa availability

The August 2026 Visa Bulletin demonstrates that numerical constraints remain significant in some employment-based categories.

Future movement, retrogression or legislative changes could directly affect talent retention.

International STEM enrollment

The 2025 decline in international S&E master’s enrollment needs to be monitored over multiple years.

A one-year movement should not automatically be treated as a permanent trend.

But given the large role international students play in advanced STEM degrees, sustained declines would have implications for universities, research programs and employers.

Domestic STEM pipeline capacity

BLS still projects STEM employment to grow substantially faster than non-STEM employment through 2034.

Schools and colleges therefore cannot assume international talent eliminates the need for domestic expansion.

Skilled technical workforce demand

National strategies involving semiconductors, artificial intelligence, data centers, critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, energy and defense require workers across many credential levels.

TechEd Magazine’s recent analysis of the $100 Million Critical Minerals Workforce Plan illustrates how quickly strategic industrial policy can create education requirements spanning university research through technician preparation.

Research on substitution and complementarity

Penn Wharton’s estimated relationship between domestic and foreign STEM workers is central to its results.

Future research testing that relationship will matter considerably.

TechEd Magazine Perspective

The most important number in Penn Wharton’s new study may not be 4%.

It may be 42%.

Temporary visa holders earned 42% of U.S. science and engineering master’s degrees in 2024.

Or perhaps it is 54%—their share of U.S. engineering doctorates.

Or 22%—the foreign-born share of America’s broad STEM workforce.

Those figures reveal something more important than one immigration proposal.

The United States does not have a purely domestic STEM pipeline.

It has a talent ecosystem.

American elementary and secondary schools feed it.

CTE feeds it.

Community colleges feed it.

Universities feed it.

Graduate research feeds it.

Employers feed it.

And international students and foreign-born workers feed it.

None can simply replace the others.

An immigration system capable of retaining exceptional scientists and engineers cannot compensate for weak mathematics preparation in middle school.

A world-class university cannot replace the technician programs needed to operate a semiconductor fab.

A community college cannot independently create the Ph.D. research workforce behind advanced materials or artificial intelligence.

And expanding domestic STEM education does not automatically mean the United States should stop competing internationally for talented people.

The strategic challenge is integration.

America must become better at developing talent, exposing students to opportunity, teaching technical skills, creating progression routes, attracting global expertise and retaining people who contribute to innovation.

That is why the Penn Wharton analysis belongs in an education publication.

It is not simply an immigration study.

It is another piece of evidence that workforce policy and education policy have become inseparable.

The strongest national STEM strategy will not ask whether America should educate its own students or attract talent from around the world.

It will ask how to do both while building a system in which a middle-school student, a CTE learner, a community-college technician, an engineering undergraduate, an international master’s student and a doctoral researcher can all become part of the same innovation economy.

That is not a pipeline.

It is infrastructure.